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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 8731

-vs.ANGELO JOE TELLAY,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 20, 1957, defendant was convicted of
burglary in the second degree in the Third Judicial District Court. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term
in the State Penitentiary.
Respondent accepts the statement of facts as submitted in defendant's brief. There is also presented hereinafter in this brief the basic facts as proved at trial.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT

I.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CON1
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VICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
Section 76-9-3, U.C.A. 1953, defines the offense of
second degree burglary.
Every person who, in the nighttime, forcibly
breaks and enters, or without force enters an open
door, window or other aperture of, any house,
room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse,
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building,
or any tent, vessel, water craft, railroad car, automobile, automobile trailer, aeroplane or aircraft
with intent to commit larceny or any felony, is
guilty of burglary in the second degree. • • •
The offense of second degree burglary includes the element of intent and defendant's appeal is directed solely
to that element, Yiz., whether there was sufficient evidence
to prove that defendant committed the acts alleged with
"• • • intent to commit larceny or any felony, • • •."
We have no substautial disagreement with appellant
on matters of law. In a criminal conYiction, each element of an offense, including that of intent, must be
proved beyond a. reasonable doubt. State v. Clark (Utah),
223 P. 2d 184. The issue here concerns itself with the
proof of intent. It is a general rule that intent, being a
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state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof and
must, therefore, be proved by circumstantial evidence.
9 Am. J ur. 271, Burglary, Sec. 61 and 12 C.J.S. 731, Burglary, Sec. 55. In State v. Woodruff (1929), 225 N.W.
254, an Iowa case, the defendant was apprehended inside
a dwelling house at night. It did not appear that he had
taken any property. He made no explanation as to the
reason for his presence in the house. On an appeal by
the State from a directed verdict for the defendant, the
Appellate Court reversed. The Court said:
The general rule is that in the absence of explanation, the jury may infer from the fact of his breaking and entering that his intent was to commit larceny. In ascertaining the intent, the jury may
take into consideration all the other facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence, and bearing
upon that question.
See also State v. Maxwell, 42 Iowa 211.
In Alexander v. State (Texas), 20 S.W. 756, it was
said:
Although there was no direct evidence of the intent, it might be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. The weight to be given these was a
question properly left to the jury; and when a person enters a building through a window at a late
hour of the night, after the lights are extinguished,
and no explanation is given of his intent, it may
well be inferred that his purpose was to commit
larceny, such being the usual intent under such circumstances.
See also Vickery v. State (1911 Texas), 137 S.W. 687.
3
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In a very recent Idaho case, the court commented
on the proof of intent in a burglary prosecution. Ex Parte
Seyfried (1953 Idaho), 264 P. 2d 685. A conviction for
burglary was taken to the Idaho Supreme Court on a writ
of habeas corpus. The defendant had been apprehended
at night in the dwelling house of another by police officers.
He had taken no property when apprehended. He made
no explanation of his presence in the house. The court
held that the magistrate was justified in committing the
defendant for trial and the order quashing the writ and
remanding the defendant was affirmed. The court said:
Where a dwelling house is broken and entered in
the nighttime and no lawful motive or purpose is
shown or appears, or any satisfactory or reasonable explanation given for such breaking and entering, the presumption arises that the breaking
and entering were accomplished with the intent
to commit larceny. The fact that the officers were
present and apprehended the burglar before he
had an opportunity to carry his purpose into execution is of no importance. The crime of burglary was consummated when the unlawful entry
was made ·with intent to steal or commit some
felony therein. Sec.18-1401, I.C.
The common experiences of mankind raise a
strong presumption and inference that such a
breaking and entering as is here shown was made
with the purpose of committing larceny, no other
purpose appearing. It is sufficient to show the essential unlawful intent when tl1e entry was made
by circumstantial evidence. Direct eYidence of such
i111<'nt is not requirl'd. One's intent may be proved
by l1is nets and conduct, and such is the usual and
en stomal')' mode of proving intent. "" • •
4
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In an old Utah case, People v. Morton, 1886, 11 P.
512, this court held that where the facts are such that it
is impossible to account for the presence of the defendant in the place where he was arrested, unless on the
hypothesis that he was there to commit larceny, a conviction of burglary is justified.
With the foregoing rules in mind, we proceed to
consider appellant's contention, which will be discussed
in two phases, first, since the evidence is largely circumstantial, does that circumstantial evidence prove i!)j;ent
and, second, was there evidence that defendant was intoxicated to the extent that he could not form the requisite
intent?
There was sufficient proof of defendant's intent as
required by the statute. There was no direct proof of
intent, as is the usual case in burglary prosecutions, but
the basic circumstantial evidence as proved raises the presumption of intent. That presumption was not rebutted
at the trial. The following facts were proved:
(1) That a window was broken out of the building (a
foundry business building) on the night of the
entry.
(2) That police officers, called to the scene by a night
watchman, heard a pounding noise on the inside
of a set of double doors and afterwards, upon inspection, it was found that the locks to the doors
had been broken.
5
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(3) That almost immediately after the pounding
noise ceased the defendant climbed out of the
broken window space.
( 4) That the entry occurred at night, at about
10:30 p.m.

( 5) That defendant had no permission to enter the
building.
(6) That no explanation was made as to the reason
for defendant's presence in the building.
(7) That defendant, when apprehended, had apparently taken no property.
In addition to the above, the defendant made certain
admissions tending to show a felonious intent. (See pages
71, 72 and 79 of the Trial Record.) Officer Clayton testified that "--Tellay; he stated that he was sorry that the
other guys got messed up. Then he asked the girl why
she didn't take off--." "--and she says that she
didn't want to leaYe him there to take the rap, and he
says, well, you should haYe ; .. . "Then, he asked why she
didn't let him know the police w-ere there ahead of
time, • • •. '' See Trial Record, pages 71 and 72. Officer
Kt'lmC'th PPek testified tha.t at the jail, after booking the
defendant, the latter asked him wh~- the rest of them had
to be atTPsted, that it wasn't any of their doings, it was
just him. See Trial Record, page 79.
There was no evidence submitted to show that defendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of form6
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ing an intent to commit larceny or another felony. Three
police officers who were on the scene and who apprehended the defendant testified that in their opinion he was not
drunk. They testified variously that he spoke ''plainly''
and did not have difficulty understanding; that his movements were steady and that he had "full capabilities."
See Trial Record, pages 51, 57, 59, 60 and 71. One officer
testified in fact that he could not tell that the defendant
had been drinking. See Trial Record, page 59. There
was testimony by witnesses for the defense that the defendant had been drinking but none of them stated that
the defendant was intoxicated or drunk. Counsel for defendant laid great stress on the fact that the broken window space was small and that there was a certain amount
of jagged glass remaining in it, and yet it was testified
by several of the witnesses that they observed the defendant climb out of the window. This act obviously required a reasonable degree of agility and steadiness.
Considering the evidence adduced, there is no other
reasonable hypothesis which the jury could have found.
No explanation was made why defendant was in this
building at a late hour. Appellant, in his conclusion,
suggests four hypotheses, any of which he claims might
account for defendant's actions. Under the facts of the
case they are not reasonable, nor were they suggested
by the evidence at trial. First, a person would not reasonably break a window and climb into a strange building merely for the purpose of escaping his wife, even
supposing a wife of such annoying and dangerous characteristics. Why not run from her or hide in less difficult
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seclusion~ It is noted that one of the defendant's witnesses, in fact, testified that when last seen by her, defendant was chasing his wife. See Trial Record, page 92.
The hypothesis and the evidence are not consistent. There
was other evidence that the wife had on previous occasions called the police because of defendant's conduct.
This certainly does not seem consistent with a theory that
the husband was running to escape the wife. Second, again
there was no evidence that defendant was intoxicated.
Third, there was no evidence that the defendant desired
to seclude himself from the rest of the party as is suggested, and even if so, why pick such a difficult and
unusual hiding place f Fourth, if defendant desired to
use a toilet, a circumstance about which nothing was said
at the trial, why break a window and climb into a strange
building? It was night and it would seem that a person
could more easily seclude himself for such a temporary
necessity.
CO~CLUSIOX

It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.

E. R. C~\LLISTER
Attorney General
GARY L. THEURER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Responden.t
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